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 [*255] Commentators often lament the fact that the First Amendment's free speech and press 
protections do not apply to the private university student press. n1 Some have argued that First 
Amendment  [*256] protection for the private-university student press should be based on state 
action doctrine, n2 but these arguments have received little approval in the courts. n3 The Student 
Press Law Center, meanwhile, has advised those involved with a private-university student press 
to convince the university to create such a protection through formal policy statements that grant 
private university students freedoms similar, if not identical, to those granted to students at 
public universities. n4 Such a policy should include "a strong and clear statement affirming the 
rights of student editors to make all content decisions and assume all responsibility for student 
media." n5 The SPLC contends that the creation of a public university free-press model through 
such policy statements could insulate the private university from liability n6 because after 
adopting such policies, private universities faced with lawsuits could "point to the policy and 
argue that the student journalists are not like employees in an agency relationship, but more like 
independent contractors exempt from vicarious liability theory." n7 The question that remains for 
private university student press advisers and others who are responsible for a private university 
student press is, will the creation of a free-press model at a private university protect the 
university in a vicarious liability lawsuit resulting from the publication of content by the private-
university  [*257] student press? n8 Given the trend in vicarious liability law, this article argues 
that it is highly unlikely that such policy statements will protect a private university from liability 
for torts committed by its dependent student press. n9 The adoption of policies and procedures 
designed to prevent and correct foreseeable misconduct associated with the dissemination of 
student-produced content, however, will help protect a private university from vicarious liability 
arising from the operation of its student press. 
 
LEGAL LIABILITY 
According to the Student Press Law Center, "The general principle behind legal liability is that 
any person who could and should have prevented an injury from occurring can be held 
responsible for it." n10 Thus, in the context of a libel claim resulting from the publication of a 
news story, " Everyone who takes a responsible part in the publication is liable for the 
defamation.'" n11 In the world of the commercial press, responsibility also extends to the 
publisher and the company that owns the publication in question. The same cannot be  [*258] 
said, however, for a public university in the context of a claim resulting from a news story 
published by the student press. n12 Public universities are generally not held liable because they 
lack the constitutional authority to review the content of student publications. n13 According to 
the Student Press Law Center, a public university that complies with the constraints of the First 
Amendment should be protected from liability, whereas a public university that engages in 
censorship of its student press would most likely be liable not only for a First Amendment 
infringement claim by student editors but also for any lawsuits arising from the publication itself 
through a vicarious liability claim. n14 Basing its advice on "a growing body of law," the SPLC 
counsels public universities to adopt a "hands-off" approach with regard to the student media. n15 
This same approach has been proposed by the SPLC also in the context of the private-university 
student press, n16 even though no First Amendment bar exists to prevent a private university from 
exercising content control over student media. n17 The lack of a First Amendment prohibition 
3 
 
regarding administrative interference with the student press leaves a private university open to 
legal liability from the content of student publications. n18 The main source of legal liability for a 
private university operating a student press is vicarious liability. n19 
 
 [*259] AGENCY RELATIONSHIP 
The doctrine of vicarious liability, also referred to as "respondeat superior," defines the situation 
in which a principal or "master" is liable for the torts of an agent or "servant." n20 Based on the 
agency relationship in which the principal "controls or has the right to control the physical 
conduct of [an agent] in the performance of the service," n21 vicarious liability is "intended to 
coordinate the costs, risks, and losses of a business with its benefits, advantages, and profits" n22 
by making a principal vicariously liable for the torts of an agent committed while acting within 
the "scope of employment." n23 Vicarious liability, then, forces the business owner "to pay costs, 
including tort liabilities, associated with [the] business" n24 by requiring that there be an agency 
relationship between the defendant and the tortfeasor. n25 
It is often said an agency relationship consists of three elements: consent by the principal and 
agent, control by the principal, and action by the agent on the principal's behalf. n26 An agency 
relationship is consensual in that both the principal and the agent in some way benefit from the 
relationship. n27 While the benefit to the principal is  [*260] most often tied to the operation of 
the business, the agent must also derive some benefit from the relationship or no reason would 
exist for the agent to be subjected to the fiduciary obligations set forth by the principal. n28 
Because vicarious liability is based on the agency relationship, "The principal will be liable only 
if the tortfeasor is a[n agent], rather than an independent contractor, and only if the tort was 
committed within the scope of the [agent's] employment." n29 The distinction between an agent 
and an independent contractor "is often said to be based on the degree of control the principal 
exerts over the agent's performance of his duties." n30 Actual control as well as the right to 
control can satisfy the control element. n31 Professor Paula J. Dalley has noted that the control 
aspect is better understood as an incident of business ownership, where "either the agent is 
employed in the principal's business, in which case the agent is a servant, or the agent is engaged 
in a business of his own, in which case he is an independent contractor." n32 Independent 
contractors, then, aid in the business enterprise but are not a part of it, whereas an agent is an 
integral part of the principal's establishment. n33 To determine whether an agency relationship 
exists between the defendant and the tortfeasor, courts widely n34 examine all of the following 
factors: n35 
a. The extent to which the principal may exercise control over the details of the agent's work and 
has the right to assign other duties; 
 
b. Whether or not the agent is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; 
 
 [*261] c. Whether the work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist 
without supervision; 
 
d. The amount of skill required to perform the work 
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e. Whether the principal or the agent supplies the tools and place of work; 
 
f. The length of time for which the agent is employed; 
 
g. The method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; h. Whether or not the work is part 
of the regular business of the principal; 
 
i. Whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of principal and agent; and 
 
j. Whether the principal is or is not in business. n36 
While the Restatement (Second) of Agency lists a number of factors to be considered in 
determining whether an independent contractor relationship exists, none of the factors listed "is 
necessarily dispositive." n37 Commentators have concluded that the distinction between an agent 
and an independent contractor may turn not only on "whether the [principal] has retained control 
or the right of control over the details of the work" n38 but also on whether the principal has the 
right to direct the agent to employ the skills necessary to accomplish a certain result. n39 
According to Professor Dalley, the list of factors is actually a way of determining " whose 
business is this'" rather than " who's in control here?'" n40 The point of the independent contractor 
exception, she writes, "is to exclude those burdens, or risks, that are not part of the defendant's 
business (because they are in fact risks of another business -- the independent contractor's)." n41 
This point also applies when determining whether an agent committed the tort within the "scope 
of employment." 
Under the vicarious liability doctrine, a principal is subjected to liability for torts that an agent 
committed while acting within the "scope of employment." n42 The Restatement defines 
"employment" as the "subject matter as to which the master and servant relation exists"  [*262] 
and scope of employment as "the extent of this subject matter." n43 Scope of employment then 
"denotes the field of action within which one is a servant." n44 
Applying this reasoning to a public university does not work because a public university is 
constitutionally prohibited from exercising content control over the student press; thus, the 
"risks" associated with the publication of student press content are not part of the "business" of 
the public university. n45 However, the vicarious liability theory may be successful in the context 
of a private university, where the university has the right to regulate content and the actions of 
student journalists because no First Amendment bar prevents it from exercising prior restraint or 
other forms of editorial control. Unless the private-university student press is separately 
incorporated or in some other way restructured as an independent auxiliary enterprise, n46 it is 
very likely that a court would perceive the "risks" associated with the operation of a student press 
as legitimate "business" risks of the university. Furthermore because a private university has the 
right to direct student journalists in the details of their work, the independent contractor 
exception would not apply. 
While no appellate case on point upholding student press rights at private institutions exists, n47 a 
New York state county court in Wallace v. Weiss n48 took up the issue of private university 
liability in connection with a libel suit against the university for a photograph published by the 
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school's student press. In its defense, the University of Rochester relied on case law in which the 
free speech rights of students were upheld against restrictive action by school administrators. 
 [*263] The university concluded from this case law that it was prohibited from exercising 
control over its student publications, and argued that because it had no control over the student 
press, it could not, therefore, be held "liable for the acts of those over whom it has no control." 
n49 
The court was quick to note that all the cases cited by the university involved First Amendment 
prohibitions on public institutions. n50 These cases, the court said, did not apply to a private 
university, which is not constitutionally bound by the First Amendment. n51 The court said that 
even though it appeared that the University of Rochester did not exercise control over its student 
press, a private university has the power to exercise such control, including the issuing of 
instructions and guidelines to those in charge of student publications and quite possibly even 
prior restraint. n52 Furthermore, the court explained that the university, by furnishing space, 
providing financial assistance, and allowing the student newspaper to use its name, "may well be 
responsible for acts" of the student press. n53 "By assisting the [student press] in its activities," the 
court concluded, the university "cannot avoid responsibility by refusing to exercise control or by 
delegating that control to another student organization." n54 
 
CONTROL, CONSENT AND BENEFIT 
Control, which is one of the three elements of an agency relationship, is often defined as the 
"essence" of the relationship, n55 and has been, perhaps, the most common test of that 
relationship. n56 Control "is met in the clearest way" when an agent is employed by a principal. 
n57 Yet, while a private university, through the nominal resources it provides to the student press, 
n58 may or may not believe it "employs" its student journalists, the question in vicarious liability 
often comes down to whether the university had the right to control the actions of the students in 
"respect to the very thing from which the injury  [*264] arose." n59 In Mazart v. State of New 
York, n60 a New York state court took up the issue of control in a vicarious liability claim against 
the State University of New York Binghamton for an allegedly defamatory letter to the editor 
published in the student newspaper. n61 The court held, "Control need not apply to every detail of 
an agent's conduct and can be found where there is merely a right held by the principal to make 
management and policy decisions affecting the agent." n62 However, the court held that the 
relationship between the university and the student newspaper would not "warrant the imposition 
of vicarious liability on the State for defamatory material" appearing in the student press n63 
given the "severe constitutional limitations on the exercise of any form of control by a State 
university over a student newspaper." n64 
To invalidate a charge of "control," SPLC recommends that the private university "limit its direct 
interference with content decisions" and draft a strong policy statement "affirming the rights of 
student editors to make all content decisions and assume all responsibility for the student media." 
n65 However, even though parties may take great pains to write policies and draw up contracts 
that "provide an appearance of independence," these efforts will not succeed "if the court sees a 
pattern of . . . control in the circumstances and conduct of the parties." n66 Moreover, control or 
the right to control may be established on "very attenuated" n67 grounds. In fact, in some cases, 
"There may even be an understanding that the employer shall not exercise control" as in the case 
6 
 
of a cook who is regarded in agency  [*265] law as a servant even though "it is understood that 
the employer will exercise no control over the cooking." n68 
Control or the right to control may be established in the context of a dependent private-university 
student press even though the university disclaims any editorial control. In such a context, 
student media receive financial support from the university in the form of a direct subsidy or 
from student activity fees. n69 In addition, the university may provide office space, utilities, 
computers and other assets and supplies, technical assistance and support services, compensation 
or wages for student journalists, reimbursement for out-ofpocket expenses incurred by the 
student journalists, and a media adviser whose salary is paid with university funds. n70 Because 
the university provides the financial support necessary to operate the student press, it also retains 
the power to approve all such expenditures. Furthermore, the university also retains the power to 
withdraw its funding as well as its declared intent to provide the students with complete editorial 
freedom at any time. Thus, the university, through its financial control and its inherent power to 
operate or regulate the activities associated with it, has established control over or the right to 
control the student press. n71 Because control may be very attenuated, one commentator argues 
that a situation where the "only significant contact between the [private] university and the 
student newspaper is the paper's status as an official student organization . . . may be sufficient to 
establish control." n72 
In addition to control, the agency relationship is based on consent and action by the agent on the 
principal's behalf. n73 Consent could be established in various forms in the private-university 
student press context, such as the recognition of the student publication as a student activity or 
organization or through financial control, distribution rights or written acknowledgement of its 
existence on campus. n74 In situations where the private university "exercises some form of 
control" over the student press, courts will most likely hold that a consensual relationship exists. 
n75 
As for the third prong of the agency relationship standard, several commentators have termed the 
stipulation that the agent  [*266] must act on behalf of the principal as the "benefit" requirement. 
n76An agent is said to be acting "on behalf of" a principal if the agent is acting "primarily for the 
benefit of the [principal] and not himself." n77 The term "benefit" is derived from the idea that the 
principal "typically expects to benefit financially by entering into [an agency] relationship," n78 
even though some agents, such as domestic servants, provide non-financial benefits to the 
principal. n79 In the context of a public university, courts have found that there is "no doubt" that 
the university "benefits" from the existence of a student press. n80 While benefit to the university 
from a student press is unlikely to be financial, it may be argued that a university benefits in 
other, non-financial ways. n81 For example, the operation of a student press may be viewed as 
central to the mission of the journalism department because it provides an experiential learning 
opportunity that is rivaled only by work within the professional industry and, therefore, increases 
the marketability of the university's journalism graduates, given the fact that mass media 
employers often prefer individuals who, in addition to having earned a bachelor's degree in 
journalism or mass communication, have experience working on college news platforms. n82 In 
Mazart, the court found that the university derived an "educational benefit"  [*267] from its 
practice of granting college credit for student participation on the newspaper in the form of an 
independent study. n83 
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In addition to the educational benefits, the existence of a student news organization provides the 
campus with an informational service. Private and public universities whose public relations 
departments submit news releases to the student press receive a benefit when the release is used 
and the event or situation is publicized. 
 
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT 
Given that an agency relationship is found to exist between a private university and its dependent 
student press, the court would then determine whether the conduct that harmed the plaintiff 
occurred within the "scope" of the student journalist's "employment." n84 Such conduct would fall 
within the "scope of employment" if it was "the very thing the [agent] was employed to do," 
however, principals "seldom employ or direct [agents] to be negligent." n85 According to the 
Restatement, conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: 
a. It is of the kind he is employed to perform; 
 
b. It occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; 
 
c. It is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master; and 
 
d. If force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not 
unexpectable by the master. n86 
Conduct, therefore, "must be of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the 
conduct authorized" to be within the scope of employment. n87 In determining whether conduct 
not authorized is so similar to or incidental to the conduct authorized as to be within the scope of 
employment, factors courts examine include whether the act is commonly performed by the 
agent or similar to other acts previously authorized by the principal; whether given their past 
history the principal could reasonably anticipate the  [*268] agent's act; whether the same act has 
been apportioned to other agents; whether the agent was using the tools or materials of the 
principal; and whether the act is outside the business of the principal. n88 A principal is not only 
liable for acts performed or achieved by an agent when the agent is operating under the direction 
of the principal, but the principal is also liable for authorized but unintended conduct of the agent 
as well as other acts in an agency relationship that the agent "is not privileged to do." n89 
While the definition of "scope of employment" is open to interpretation n90 and dependent upon 
the facts of a particular case, the ultimate question, according to the Restatement, "is whether or 
not it is just that the loss resulting from the servant's acts should be considered as one of the 
normal risks to be borne by the business in which the servant is employed." n91 Thus, the 
controlling factor in the application of vicarious tort liability can be said to center on whether the 
tort in some sense was a part of the principal's business risks. Acts that are purely motivated by 
personal interests or that are so outrageous in nature as to have no rational business purpose are, 
therefore, generally held to be outside the scope of the employment. n92 
In the commercial realm, communication torts, such as libel and invasion of privacy, are viewed 
as normal business risks of a publisher, and, thus, the publishing company is held liable for such 
8 
 
torts  [*269] committed by its reporters or editors. n93 Clearly, in such a situation, a court would 
find that a reporter or editor was engaged in "authorized conduct." n94 The fact that a journalist is 
not employed to commit libel or invade privacy "does not at all mean that such tortious acts are 
outside the scope or course of his employment." n95 To employ someone to commit a tortious act 
is illegal; therefore, vicarious liability "arises out of tortious conduct committed while the servant 
is undertaking to fulfill a particular employment." n96 The same logic and understanding of the 
law would be applied to a private university that operates a dependent student press, and a court 
would most likely consider a student reporter who published an inaccurate story that libeled a 
plaintiff to be engaged in conduct within the scope of employment. n97 In terms of defamation, 
the Restatement notes that a principal is liable for defamatory statements made by the agent 
within the scope of employment or the "apparent" scope of employment. n98 A private university 
that adopted a strong policy statement affirming the rights of students to assume all responsibility 
for the student press could argue that the conduct the student journalist is authorized to perform 
is not actuated by a purpose to serve the university. But this argument would most likely fail 
given a trend in vicarious  [*270] liability law that has expanded the scope of employment 
standard beyond its traditional limits. n99 
 
DEVIATING FROM SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT 
While "all authorities agree that there must be some connection with the principal's business" n100 
before the principal will be held vicariously liable for the acts of an agent, courts have been 
willing to expand the number of situations considered within the realm of scope of employment 
by relaxing the requirement that the tortious act be actuated by an intent to serve or benefit the 
principal. n101 In these cases, courts have applied a variety of tests and rationales n102 that 
"substitute broad questions about loss spreading and enterprise liability" for the Restatement's 
purpose-to-serve prong. n103 One such test, the forseeability or characteristic risk test, asks 
whether the general class of injury at issue in a case constitutes a risk characteristic of the 
principal's enterprise. n104 The test holds that the doctrine of vicarious liability is based on a 
"deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for 
accidents which may fairly be said to be characteristic of [the principal's] activities." n105 Under 
the test, the principal is held liable for "foreseeable" risks. "Foreseeable" or "characteristic" risks 
are those which are expected to "arise out of and in the course of'" the operation of the enterprise 
n106 in the sense that the "ordinary operation of the business enterprise increases the risk in 
question." n107 
 [*271] This line of reasoning, one commentator contends, is based on a sense of fairness. n108 
This "sense of fairness" dictates that enterpriserelated costs should be "borne by those who profit 
from" the enterprise. n109 Under this line of reasoning, it is unlikely that a private university could 
escape liability for communication torts which arise from the operation of a dependent student 
press given the fact that such risks "may fairly be said to be characteristic of [privateuniversity 
student press] activities," and "flow from [the private university's] long-run activity in spite of all 
reasonable precautions on [its] part." n110 It is quite foreseeable that a student journalist in the 
course of producing a news product might commit a communication tort, whether intentionally, 
negligently or in good faith. The fact that a private university has adopted a policy placing all 
responsibility for the production of that news product in the hands of the students does not alter 
the fact that the potential harm is foreseeable and characteristic of the operation of a private 
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university's student-operated news enterprise and that the costs associated with such a student-
operated enterprise are ultimately the costs of doing business as a private educational enterprise. 
Additional tests which have similarly deviated from the purpose-to-serve prong include the 
"three policy objectives" test, which holds a principal liable if such liability would "(1) . . . 
prevent recurrence of the tortious conduct; (2) . . . give greater assurance of compensation to the 
victim; and (3) . . . ensure that the victim's losses will be equitably borne by those who benefit 
from the enterprise that gives rise to the injury;" n111 and the enterprise liability rationale, which 
would find a principal vicariously liable for the agent's act if the act was "incident to carrying on 
an enterprise." n112 While the "great majority of courts today continue to apply" all four prongs of 
the scope of employment test, including the purpose to serve prong, these openended substitute 
standards have expanded vicarious liability far beyond the traditional agency relationship 
elements of consent, control and conduct on the principal's behalf. n113 Given this trend, one 
commentator concluded that, in addition to acts committed within the  [*272] agent's scope of 
employment, a principal may now be held vicariously liable if "the wrongful act was known or 
should have been known" by the principal. n114 
 
PERSONALLY MOTIVATED TORTS 
Regardless of the standard applied, courts generally have no difficulty determining that an 
employee was acting within the scope of employment in cases where "an employee commits a 
tort during the ordinary course of duties." n115 However, in cases where the employee was 
personally motivated to commit the tort, questions arise as to whether the principal should be 
held vicariously liable for an act that was clearly not actuated by an intent to serve or benefit the 
principal. Such cases commonly include questions of vicarious liability for sexual harassment by 
supervisory employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, n116 but could well 
include defamation provoked by malice toward a plaintiff. In the realm of the former, however, 
the Supreme Court of the United States has applied a section of the Restatement that provides the 
basis for vicarious liability where the conduct giving rise to the tort occurred outside the scope of 
employment. n117 According to Section 219(2) of the Restatement, a principal is subject to 
liability for an agent's torts committed outside the scope of employment when: 
(a) the [principal] intended the conduct or the consequences, or 
 
(b) the [principal] was negligent or reckless, or 
 
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the employer, or 
 
(d) the [agent] purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon 
apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency 
relation. n118 
 [*273] In factual situations involving sexual harassment by a supervisor, the Court has applied 
subsections (b) and (d). n119 The Court explained in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth n120 that 
under subsection (b), a principal is liable for a tort committed outside the scope of employment 
in situations where the principal's "own negligence is a cause" of the tort. n121 Agency law 
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provides for liability for harm resulting from a principal's failure to give directions or to provide 
adequate regulations. n122 In both incidences, the principal is required to use due care to prevent 
undue risk of harm to third parties resulting from improper or ambiguous orders or failing to 
make proper regulations. n123 In cases of sexual harassment, the Court said negligence also 
includes situations where the principal "knew or should have known about the conduct and failed 
to stop it." n124 Under this line of reasoning, a private university would not be able to escape 
vicarious liability by willfully turning a blind eye to tortious acts or disavowing any 




Moreover, under subsection (d), a principal is also liable for personally motivated tortious 
conduct if the agent "purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was 
reliance upon apparent authority" or if the conduct was "made possible or facilitated by the 
existence of the actual agency relationship." n125 Apparent authority, according to the 
Restatement, exists when a third party dealing with the agent believes the agent is authorized by 
the principal and reliance on that belief by the third party enables the agent to commit the tort. 
n126 Illustrations of the application of apparent authority include "a newspaper's liability for a 
libelous editorial published by an editor acting for his own purposes." n127 In such a case,  [*274] 
the credibility of the editorial is based on the principal's supposed knowledge of the editorial. n128 
The Restatement notes that defamation is effective because of the reputation of the publisher. n129 
Thus, a principal would most likely be liable for a defamatory statement under the apparent-
authority standard if it appears to readers that the agent was authorized by the principal to make 
such statements. n130 According to the Restatement, "The motive of the spokesman and the 
position he holds are . . . immaterial if the [principal] has apparently designated him to speak." 
n131 
The Supreme Court dismissed the apparent authority standard as irrelevant in the context of 
sexual harassment. "As a general rule," the Court said, "apparent authority is relevant where the 
agent purports to exercise a power which he or she does not have, as distinct from where the 
agent threatens to misuse actual power." n132 Apparent authority, then, involves the "false 
impression" of the existence of actual power, not the misuse of that power. n133 A private 
university may be liable for a defamatory statement published by the student press under this 
standard if a false impression exists as to the apparent authority of the student journalist to speak 
for the university or with authority granted to the student by the university. Either way, the 
defamatory statement gains added credibility (and the plaintiff's reputation suffers additional 
harm) because of the statement's apparent connection to the status of the university. 
 
AIDED IN THE AGENCY RELATION STANDARD 
While the Supreme Court dismissed the apparent authority standard in the sexual harassment 
context, it focused its discussion on the "agent's misuse of delegated authority" and concluded 
that the "aided-in-the-agency-relation" standard was the "appropriate form of analysis." n134 
Under the aided-in-the-agency-relation standard, the Court explained that a clear line of cases 
has held an employer liable for intentional discriminatory conduct of a supervisor when the 
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misconduct "results in a tangible employment action," n135 such as "hiring,  [*275] firing, failing 
to promote, reassignment [of] responsibilities or significant change in benefits." n136 The Court, 
however, noted that this "standard is made difficult by its malleable terminology, which can be 
read to either expand or limit liability." n137 The aided-in-the-agency-relation standard, the Court 
added, "is a developing feature of agency law." n138 
Although the Court was reluctant to render a "definitive explanation" of the standard, it relied 
upon the aided-in-the-agency-relation standard to hold a principal vicariously liable for 
personally motivated misconduct not involving a tangible employment action. n139 The Court's 
holding provides that the liability be subjected to an affirmative defense in which the principal is 
required to prove that: (a) "reasonable care" was exercised "to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the [principal] or to avoid 
harm otherwise." n140 In litigating the first element of the defense, the Court said that it is 
"appropriate" to address "the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances" 
which prompted the tortious conduct. n141 The second element may be demonstrated, according 
to the Court, upon showing a failure on the plaintiff's part to use any complaint procedure 
provided by the principal. n142 An examination of some 200 federal court cases that addressed the 
affirmative defense in relation to sexual harassment claims advanced in Ellerth and the later case 
of Faragher v. Boca Raton n143 found that "the lower federal courts have consistently held that an 
employer satisfies its obligation to prevent harassment by doing little more than creating and 
 [*276] disseminating (or posting) an anti-harassment policy with a grievance procedure." n144 In 
addition to the plaintiff's failure to report the harassment, federal courts have also concluded that 
an employer may prevail on prong two of "the affirmative defense by demonstrating nothing 
more than a prompt and appropriate response to a complaint of harassment." n145 
Because the Court read subsection (d) as consisting of two completely independent clauses and 
relied upon the second clause to hold the principal subject to vicarious liability for a supervisor's 
actionable sexual harassment, one commentator concluded that the Court's rulings in Ellerth and 
Faragher "would vastly expand vicarious tort liability, and would make the scope of employment 
requirement largely superfluous." n146 The Court's rulings, which allow vicarious liability on the 
fact that the agent is aided in the commission of the tort by the agency relationship, are "much 
too broad" since most workplace torts, in some sense, are "aided by the agency relation." n147 
Furthermore, the affirmative defense rule, the commentator argues, which excuses principals 
who take reasonable steps to prevent misconduct from liability, "is completely contrary to 
agency law's insistence that employers pay the costs of their employees' torts whether 
preventable or not." n148 According to an economic explanation of vicarious liability, the cost 
burden is placed on a principal for the tortious conduct of the agent as an incentive to induce the 
principal to exert control over the agent's actions. n149 The cost burden incentive is placed on the 
principal because agents, given their inability to pay a tort judgment, lack the impetus to take due 
care. n150 Because vicarious liability acts as an inducement for principals to exert control over 
their agents, it is not inconsistent with the principles of agency law to conclude that the cost 
burden on employers who follow through on this inducement should be lessened. 
 
 [*277] PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS 
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In 1988, the Supreme Court handed down Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier n151 and 
established the standard that censorship of the high school student press is permissible if the 
publication in question is school-sponsored, is developed within an adopted curriculum, is 
described as part of that curriculum, operates as part of a regular classroom activity, and 
functions in practice as a closed forum. n152 In such cases, "Educators are entitled to exercise 
greater control over . . . student expression to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the 
activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be 
inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not 
erroneously attributed to the school." n153 As long as school-imposed censorship is "reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns," censorship of high school publications is permitted. 
n154 
The issue of whether "the principles of Hazelwood apply to public college and university 
students" was recently addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
in Hosty v. Carter. n155 While a three judge panel held that "Hazelwood's rationale for limiting 
the First Amendment rights of high school journalism students is not a good fit for students at 
colleges or universities," n156 the panel decision was reversed upon appeal by the full panel of 
appellate court judges. n157 In its en banc decision, the Seventh Circuit held "that Hazelwood's 
framework applies to subsidized student newspapers at colleges as well as elementary and 
secondary schools." n158 But even under Hazelwood, the court noted that censorship by an 
administrator is not allowed if the underwritten student publication at the university was 
established as a public forum. n159 
 [*278] The issue of whether a school-sponsored college newspaper should be considered a 
public forum for student expression was "intently raised" n160 in Lueth v. St Clair County 
Community College. n161 At issue in the case was whether a college administrator could prohibit 
the editor of the college newspaper from accepting and publishing a specific advertisement. n162 
The court noted that the decision would turn on "the nature of the regulated forum." n163 
Government, the court said, "face[s] a lessened burden in justifying [its] restrictions" when the 
publication at issue is "deemed to be something other than [a] true public forum[]." n164 To assess 
the "public character" of the "state-controlled" college newspaper, the court turned to the 
Hazelwood standard of evaluating whether authorities "have by policy or by practice' opened 
those facilities for discriminate use by the general public,' . . . or by some segment of the public, 
such as student organizations." n165 The court relied on six criteria it said the Supreme Court 
emphasized in concluding that the newspaper at issue in Hazelwood was not a public forum. n166 
The criteria were whether the publication was developed within an adopted curriculum, a 
journalism course was associated with the publication, students received graded credits for 
working on the publication, the journalism instructor selected the editorial staff, the school 
principal conducted final review of each issue, and school officials did not deviate in practice 
from the policies surrounding the publication. n167 
The court determined that the college newspaper was a public forum, given the fact that the 
publication did not "operate in a laboratory situation'" or "under the guise of a specific academic 
course," adopted curriculum or faculty member. n168 Furthermore, the newspaper was operated 
entirely by students, freely distributed through the local community, and relied on outside 
advertisers to aid in the funding  [*279] of the publication. n169 And, finally, the court noted that 
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it could not ignore the "unequivocal language" contained in the newspaper's rules and regulations 
that placed "all policy decisions regarding what is printed in the paper, staff appointments and 
dismissals, and publication dates" under the control of the editor-in-chief. n170 The public forum 
analysis was dispositive in the court's decision which held that state-funded school officials 
violated the First Amendment rights of the newspaper's editor-in-chief by prohibiting her from 
running a specific advertisement. n171 
The Supreme Court has often applied a public forum analysis to issues regarding government-
imposed restrictions on a speaker's access to public property as well as on expressive activity 
within educational settings. n172 Most recently, the Sixth Circuit relied on the public forum theory 
n173 in a case involving actions taken by school officials to withhold the distribution of yearbooks 
from the university community. n174 To determine whether the government intended to create a 
limited public forum, the court examined the university's policy and practice with respect to the 
yearbook as well as the nature of the yearbook and its " compatibility with expressive activity.'" 
n175 The court found that university policy and practice placed editorial control of the yearbook in 
the hands of student editors, n176 and the student handbook "described the yearbook as a "student 
publication.'" n177 Moreover, the court noted that the fact that the issue arises  [*280] within the 
context of a public university "mitigates in favor of finding that the yearbook is a limited public 
forum." n178 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the yearbook was a " journal of expression and 
communication in the public forum sense,'" and as such the university's confiscation of the 
publication violated the First Amendment rights of its students. n179 
Given courts' reliance on the public forum analysis to uphold the First Amendment rights of 
students at public institutions, it is logical that the SPLC would conclude that "the best way for a 
private university to protect itself is to limit its direct interference with content and production 
decisions" and adopt a written policy that "affirm[s] the rights of student editors to make all 
content decisions and assume all responsibility for student media" and "prevents [university] 
officials from exercising content control over student publications." n180 But the fact that private-
university student publications function as a public forum will not protect the university from 
vicarious liability. Vicarious liability, which operates from the central question of "whether a risk 
is inherent in the business," n181 basically rests on the risks-and-benefits-of-the-business theory. 
n182 This theory asserts that: 
 
The principal retains all the incidents of ownership of the enterprise: ultimate (although perhaps 
not day-to-day) control; the benefit of profits, revenues, and opportunities arising from the 
business; ownership of (and exclusive right to use) business property; responsibility for financial 
losses; and liability for tort and contractual obligations of the business. n183 
Under this theory, a student press operated by a private university would most likely be 
conceived as a part of the "ownership" of the university's "business," and, therefore, the 
university would retain all the incidents of that ownership, including vicarious liability for tort 
and contractual obligations of the student press. A private uni versity,  [*281] then, could neither 
retain the benefits of advertising revenue from a student-produced publication while disclaiming 
the authority of the student who initiated the advertising contract nor avail itself of the news 
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services provided by student journalists then escape the obligations entered into by these same 
students in accordance with that service. n184 As a result, the risks involved with operating a 
student press at a private university should be viewed as a cost of doing business, regardless of 
whether the primary role of that "cost" is to provide an experiential learning experience to 
journalism students or a public forum for the campus community. 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
Given the examination of vicarious liability law, it is most likely that an agency relationship 
between a private university and student journalists working on a dependent student press could 
be established easily and clearly. By its very nature, a dependent student press operates with the 
consent of the private university, and, at the very least, provides an informational benefit to the 
university. Private universities, while they may have a hands-off policy regarding editorial 
decisions, nonetheless have the right to control the actions of student journalists who work on 
dependent student-operated publications. Furthermore, any loss resulting from the actions of 
student journalists working on a dependent student press would most likely be considered by a 
court as a normal and foreseeable business risk that should be borne by the university regardless 
of whether the university adopted a policy negating their responsibility for editorial decisions. 
Even in situations where the student journalist was personally motivated to commit a tort, a 
private university could still be vicariously liable for the tortious actions of the student. Liability 
in this instance could arise if the harm resulted from a failure on the part of the university to give 
clear directions or provide adequate regulations or if a false impression exists as to the authority 
of the student to speak for the university or with authority granted by the university. Moreover, a 
private university may be vicariously liable for a tortious act if the student was aided in the 
commission of the tort by the agency relationship. While the aided in relationship standard is a 
"developing  [*282] feature" of vicarious liability law, n185 the standard, as the Supreme Court 
noted, "can be read to either expand or limit liability." n186 
Such statements regarding the malleable nature of vicarious liability are likely to give private 
universities that operate dependent student publications pause. Furthermore, it is clear from the 
trend in vicarious liability law that statements and policies written to counteract the legitimate 
cost burdens of an enterprise will not protect that enterprise from legal liability. However, fully 
recognizing the risks inherent in operating a student press might negate or at least mitigate legal 
liability given the Court's holding that vicarious liability for personally motivated misconduct be 
subjected to an affirmative defense. This defense requires proof that reasonable care was 
exercised to prevent and correct promptly any misconduct and that preventive or corrective 
opportunities of which the plaintiff failed to take advantage were provided. n187 In relation to 
sexual harassment claims, for example, some 200 federal courts have concluded that an 
employer satisfies prong one of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense by "creating and 
disseminating (or posting) an antiharassment policy with a grievance procedure." n188 Prong two 
is satisfied when the plaintiff fails to report the tortious conduct or the employer can demonstrate 
a "prompt and appropriate response" to the plaintiff's complaint. n189 Thus, instead of creating 
policy that renounces the university's responsibility for the actions and activities of student 
journalists, the Court's holding in Ellerth and Faragher instructs enterprises to enact policies and 
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procedures designed to prevent and correct foreseeable misconduct that is characteristic of their 
business enterprise. 
Private universities as well as journalism educators who work for such institutions are fully 
aware of the risks associated with the dissemination of student-produced content. A 
communication torts policy should define these risks and the conduct prohibited. It should also 
provide a clear and consistent procedure for the reporting and investigation of complaints and 
grievances concerning published content as well as delineate the scope of corrective action that 
may result from a successful complaint. In addition the university may also wish to define the 
scope of the policy in terms of its purpose, the parties to whom it applies, and the department 
and/or offices responsible  [*283] for administrating the policy. When defining the purpose of 
the policy, the university may include a statement confirming its commitment to editorial 
freedom for student journalists. Such a statement may be qualified in terms of the expected 
pedagogical outcomes derived from editorial independence. 
Because publications are complex enterprises that require expertise from multiple areas -- news 
editorial, advertising, visual communication, print production and Web technology, for example 
-- the responsibility of administrating a communication torts policy should not fall to a dean of 
student services, director of student activities, provost, university president or college dean. 
These individuals cannot effectively manage such a policy in addition to performing their 
customary duties. Journalism educators should take the lead, therefore, in crafting and 
administering such a policy as well as providing opportunities for additional training for student 
editors regarding tort liability and the private university press. Private university educators who, 
for whatever reason, do not wish to create an auxiliary or independent student press and, thus, 
maintain "control" of student-run media n190 must accept their responsibility as publishers of 
student-produced content, and work to implement a policy that not only mitigates the university's 
liability risks but also provides a richer, more exhaustive experiential learning environment for 
the students. 
In a recently published book on the American press, journalism educator Theodore L. Glasser 
and Fortune magazine senior writer Marc Gunther contend that "journalism organizations 
marginalize themselves" when "they ignore the larger and arguably more important issues in 
journalism" such as a division of labor which exists in news organizations that "fails to place 
journalists in control of journalism." n191 Needless to say, the same might be said of journalism 
educators in regard to the operation of a dependent student press. By focusing on a hands-off 
public university model, journalism educators at private universities neither reap the legal 
protections of such a structure nor offer students a distinctive experiential learning environment. 
By creating a private university student press model that is anchored around a basic 
communication torts policy, journalism  [*284] educators at private institutions could improve 
the standards of quality, accountability, and professionalism required from their student 
journalists while mitigating the university's liability from the operation of a student press. 
This model should spell out the ethical and legal standards to which all student journalists must 
adhere. These standards should foster sound, independent news judgment and encourage the type 
of watchdog journalism that challenges university administrators as well as provide specific 
policy guidelines on the conduct and practices often associated with communication torts. 
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Journalistic conduct and practices covered by the policy would likely include the use of unnamed 
sources and promises of anonymity, use of quotations and reporting from other news sources, 
rebuttals and corrections, fact checking and the red flagging of accusatory language, impartial 
and dispassionate handling of controversial issues and subjects, accuracy, relationship with news 
sources and advertisers, misrepresentation of identity or intent, use of photography and graphics, 
fabrication and plagiarism, conflicts of interest, standards of decency, accountability, legitimate 
and ethical newsgathering practices, and the use of intellectual property. n192 In addition to 
providing guidelines on acceptable and unacceptable conduct, a communication tort policy must 
also include procedural guidelines for the reporting and investigation of complaints and 
grievances concerning published content and the delineation of corrective action that may result 
from a successful complaint. Such guidelines might encourage potential plaintiffs to first address 
their concerns with the editor-in-chief of the student publication before filing a formal complaint 
with a publications board, student press ombudsman, or some other designated oversight body. 
The scope of corrective action may include the running of retractions or corrections to the record 
to the dismissal of student journalists. 
Without question, the effective operation of a student-operated press is central to the educational 
objectives of university journalism programs. n193 Such an operation provides students with an 
experiential  [*285] learning opportunity that is rivaled only by work within the professional 
industry itself. Students involved in the publishing process in relation to these operations should 
have the same degree of freedom and responsibility as their professional counterparts. This 
includes the freedom-responsibility of determining what is and is not "news" and of actively 
investigating and reporting on that news. It also includes the observance and application of 
traditional journalistic values, such as accuracy, balance, fairness, objectivity, and social 
responsibility, and the adherence to basic policies that set the standards of quality and 
professional accountability for working journalists. 
Accountability, journalism educators Carolyn Marvin and Philip Meyer argue, "is an emergent 
aspect of professionalism" that takes courage and honesty. n194 It is a concept that calls on 
journalists to not only publicly acknowledge mistakes but to also create a "culture of safeguards 
against error and distortion" n195 by instituting "visible steps to minimize their reoccurrence." n196 
A communications torts policy intended to prevent the occurrence of communication torts by 
student journalists and provide a reporting procedure whereby the university will respond to a 
report of a violation of the policy is a step toward creating a professional culture of journalistic 
accountability that may well enhance the experiential learning experience students receive at a 
private university as it works to produce responsible and credible journalists. 
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